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International Legal Updates
North America and the
Caribbean
More Violence for the People of
Lomas de Poleo
Since 2002, the community of Lomas
de Poleo, a dusty neighborhood on the
western outskirts of Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua, Mexico has been fighting for
ownership of land where many residents
have lived for more than twenty years. The
original settlers petitioned the national
Agrarian Reform Institute for title in 1970,
and five years later, the land was declared
“Property of the Nation” by then Mexican
President Luis Echeverría. Perhaps that
would have been the most interesting part
of the story of Lomas de Poleo had the
prominent Zaragoza family not claimed
the land as its own. In 2002, it became
clear that the land was in a key geographic
location for the western expansion of Ciudad Juárez and its sister city in the United
States, El Paso. With much money to be
made and only Lomas de Poleo in the way,
the neighborhood has been at the center of
major human rights violations committed
by the Zaragozas, the local Juárez government, and the Mexican government.
Much has been written about the struggles of the people of Lomas de Poleo.
Their grievances are too numerous to list,
but include having their neighborhood
surrounded by barbed wire and guard
towers, their privately installed electricity
and water systems destroyed, their homes
bulldozed and burned (some with children
inside), and residents beaten, harassed,
shot, and intimidated. The local government and police force have done nothing
to stop the death and destruction, and but
for the involvement of international human
rights groups and brave attorneys, the last
twenty or so families of the 400 who once
lived there would likely be dead or gone.
Instead, with the assistance provided by the
Mexican human rights law firm Tierra y
Libertad and lawyers like Barbara Zamora
and Digna Ochoa, the people of Lomas de
Poleo have sought official recognition of
their ownership of the land. Their claim is
now before the Ciudad Chihuahua Agrar-

ian Tribunal, and after years of delay and
stall tactics, it appears that the Tribunal
may soon rule in favor of the remaining
families.
Still, on what seems to be the eve of
victory, the violence shows no signs of
abating. On December 4, 2009, Adelaida
Plasencia Sierra, a resident of Lomas de
Poleo, was shot in the doorway of her
home after two masked men came asking
for gasoline. The police labeled the event a
“common robbery attempt” although nothing was stolen and the men never entered
her house. This latest, seemingly random
act of violence shows that even in the face
of defeat in the Tribunal, the community,
police, and the mayor of Ciudad Juárez
continue to accommodate and embolden
the Zaragozas. As the families of Lomas
de Poleo are either intimidated or enticed
away from the area, time is clearly on the
Zaragozas’ side. If the international human
rights community fails to keep pressure
on the situation, there will be no families
left to defend the community’s legal rights.
Few cases so well demonstrate the truth
of the adage, “Justice delayed is justice
denied.”

Haiti’s Vulnerable Children
after the Earthquake
In the days after the devastating January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) issued
warnings about the dangers that Haitian
children would face as aid pours in and the
nation tries to rebuild. Ironically, though
much of that danger comes from the devastation caused by the earthquake, some of it
comes as a by-product of the humanitarian
efforts that seek to help those very children. With little governmental oversight
and regulation before the earthquake, the
destruction of nearly every government
office in Port-au-Prince almost certainly
means there will be even less protection
for children, at least in the near future.
Under the cover of the enormous amount
of unregulated and unmonitored humanitarian work, child exploitation and trafficking may explode beyond what was already
an endemic problem in Haiti. Perceiving
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this threat, officials in Haiti suspended
all extra-national adoption activities, even
those approved prior to the earthquake.
Anecdotal evidence of this danger is
already coming to light. Children have
reportedly been offered for sale and kidnapped from hospitals in the weeks since
the earthquake. The most sensational incident involving Haitian children occurred
on February 4, when ten American Baptist
missionaries were charged with “criminal
association” and “kidnapping” for attempting to bring 33 Haitian children across the
border to the Dominican Republic. They
had no official papers for the children,
many of whom were not even orphans,
but rather were handed over by parents or
relatives who believed they would have
better lives outside Haiti. The American
missionaries were reportedly warned by
Dominican officials that without proper
documentation, they could be detained and
charged with child trafficking. While all
ten were initially charged at their February
4 hearing, the Haitian judge ordered eight
of them released on February 17.
The American missionaries and their
actions represent the confusing collision
of the humanitarian aid that the country
so desperately needs with the questionable and destructive practice of speedy
child adoption that has led to repeated and
widespread violations of children’s rights
in Haiti. Prosecuting the Americans to the
fullest extent would have sent a message
that anyone wishing to adopt a Haitian
child must follow the local laws, possibly
preventing some confusion for parents
wishing to put their children up for adoption. However, such a message would be
unlikely to address the underlying issues
facing Haitian children, nor would it dissuade child traffickers who prey on Haitian
children using less overt channels than the
American missionaries. Ideally, the arrest
of the Americans was not just an attempt at
setting an example, but an instance of the
government and judicial system working to
protect its people and its children in ways
that have been elusive in the past.
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Still Castro’s Cuba?
It has been nearly three and a half years
since Fidel Castro first delegated his powers
to his brother, First Secretary of the Cuban
Communist Party Raúl Castro. Though
initially temporary, the transfer of power
became permanent in February 2008 when
Raúl Castro officially became President
of Cuba. The new President Castro began
his tenure with some welcome reforms,
such as allowing greater cell phone use,
permitting the purchase of consumer electronics, and allocating unused government
land for private use. While these reforms
have given previously unheard-of freedoms to the people of Cuba, they do not
address the greater human rights issues
endemic to the country. One major reform
now possible for Cuba is to rejoin the
Inter-American human rights system. The
General Assembly of the Organization of
American States (OAS) passed a resolution in June 2009, lifting the 47-year-old
ban on Cuba’s participation and allowing
Cuba to begin the process of becoming a
fully functioning member state. With no
outside venue for addressing human rights
violations in Cuba, full membership in the
OAS would allow its citizens access to at
least one level of supranational review, the
Inter-American human rights system.
Over seven months have passed since
the General Assembly removed the ban,
and Cuba has made no sign of interest in
participating in the OAS. Further, after
two years of Raúl Castro’s administration, it is ever clearer what the future of
human rights in Cuba will be under his
rule. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and
the Cuban Commission for Human Rights
and National Reconciliation issued their
2009 reports on the state of human rights
in Cuba. Both reports note that the number
of political dissidents imprisoned in the
country has fallen over the past two years,
from nearly 300 to just above 200 today.
The reports also note that the number of
people on death row in Cuba has dropped
sharply. Still, as the reported number of
jailed dissidents falls, the reported incidents of harassment and abuse continue
to rise. The HRW report directly criticizes
Raúl Castro’s continuation of his brother’s
policies: “The government continues to
enforce political conformity using criminal
prosecutions, long- and short-term detentions, mob harassment, surveillance, police
warnings, and travel restrictions.”

The arrest of human rights activist
Jorge Luís García Pérez, best known as
“Antúnez,” and his wife on January 19,
2010 while they were working to organize
an independent library in Santiago de Cuba
province. is a reminder of the continued
repressive tactics of Castro’s Cuba. Antúnez
and his wife were released on January 21
without any formal charges filed against
them. Antúnez has been detained briefly
many times since his release from prison
in April 2007 after 17 years as a political
prisoner. Such treatment begs the question
of whether short detentions will replace
long ones as the new Castro regime’s
harassment of choice. Furthermore, with
no venue like the Inter-American system
to challenge such treatment, Antúnez has
little legal recourse.
Time will reveal whether Raúl Castro
will depart from more of his brother’s policies. Ultimately, becoming an active member in the OAS again is a necessary reform
for Cuba; doing so would give activists like
Antúnez a legal voice where one is needed
most. Whatever Raúl Castro may say publicly about Cuba fully participating in the
OAS, the international community should
not abandon the effort of pressuring Cuba
to do so. At the very least, thanks to the
General Assembly’s Resolution, the choice
is now Cuba’s to make.
Evan Wilson, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, covered North
America and the Caribbean for this issue
of the Human Rights Brief.

Latin America
A Balancing Act: Trends in Latin
American Media Laws
Both Argentina and Venezuela have
media laws that seek to prevent small
groups of private companies from controlling media outlets and to foster public support for the government. Such laws may
be justified given the countries’ history
with coup d’états and corporate influence
over the media. Nevertheless, the laws’
severe restrictions have, in some instances,
amounted to censorship. Meanwhile,
Bolivia is considering similar reforms to
its laws.
On its face, Venezuela’s 2004 Social
Responsibility Law appears to pursue legitimate governmental aims. The law requires
41

every station to air at least seven hours of
national programming a day, which may
include cultural and educational shows.
Four of the seven hours must be produced
by national companies or organizations.
Moreover, the law indicates the number of
times a day that media stations must play
the national anthem. Regulations like these
are meant to foster support for the national
government by ensuring that the public
hears significant amount of programs that
portray the government and country in a
positive light.
Opponents to the law argue that it
hinders freedom of expression. The law
provides for harsh penalties for non-compliance, including confiscation of airtime
and imposition of fines. Further, it prohibits any reference to violence, illegal
activity, or political uprising. Finally, in
January 2010 President Hugo Chavez used
the law to take six stations off air, including Radio Caracas Television International
(RCTV), Venezuela’s largest private media
source. RCTV is known to be highly antiChavez and supported the 2002 coup d’état
attempt against the President. Chavez justified taking RCTV off air by saying it did
not broadcast the entirety of his lengthy
speeches as required by the Social Responsibility Law.
Similarly, in December 2009 Argentine legislators passed the Audio-Visual
Communications Law with the goal of
diversifying the types of entities that own
the media. The law requires that private
companies, the government, and civil society each control one third of radio and
television channels in order to encourage
broader local participation and to diversify
broadcasting. The United Nations has been
supportive of the initiative, calling it the
“democratization” of Argentina’s media
by making broadcasting accessible to a
broader range of society.
Although the law has not yet come into
force, it seems to regulate broadcasting
through different means than the Venezuelan law. Whereas the Venezuelan law
explicitly prohibits the broadcast of anything anti-government and pro-violence,
the Argentine law, by redistributing control
of the channels, limits previously existing stations from broadcasting to their
full extent. For example, if a private station previously controlled forty percent of
channels, and under the new law controls
only a third, some of its programs must be
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taken off the air. While promoting democratic principles through greater social
participation in the media, the Argentine
law provides the government with more
regulatory power over the national media
than it has previously had.
A third country, Bolivia, may also
reform its media laws. During his reelection acceptance speech in September 2009,
Bolivian President Evo Morales announced
that he is considering new media laws that
would redistribute control of broadcasting
channels so that corporations do not own
all of the channels. As Latin American
governing parties try to foster national support, they are strategically turning to media
outlets to help gather support, while also
trying to ensure that the media is not used
against them.
These regulatory trends in Latin America show efforts to democratize the media
and make it accessible to groups outside of
the powerful media corporations, but the
regulations might at times come close to
censorship. The right to freedom of expression is protected and prior censorship is
prohibited by Article 13 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, with an
exception for material that might pose a
threat to national security or incite lawlessness or war. Emerging Latin American
media regulatory laws should be checked
against the American Convention on
Human Rights to ensure that government
regulations do not interfere with the freedom of expression.

Activists in Latin America Make
Progress on Gay Marriage
In December 2009, gay rights activists in Mexico and Argentina took steps
to uphold the rights of same-sex couples. Mexico City’s legislative assembly
voted to change the definition of marriage,
while in Argentina an official from Tierra
del Fuego Province officiated over Latin
America’s first same-sex marriage even
after a national judge filed an injunction
prohibiting the couple from marrying in
Buenos Aires.
Activists in each country have taken different approaches to the struggle for marriage equality. In Argentina the struggle
began in the courts, while in Mexico City
activists went directly to the legislature.
Notwithstanding this strategic difference,
the question of gay marriage has sparked

similar debates in both countries: both are
predominantly Roman Catholic and struggle with whether gay marriage is moral.
The saga in Argentina began in November 2009 when Judge Gabriela Seijas from
the Buenos Aires State Court declared the
civil code unconstitutional and ordered
the civil registry to grant Alejandro Freyre
and José María di Bello a marriage license
if they sought one. Specifically, Seijas
declared Article 172 of the national civil
code, which defines marriage as an agreement between a “man and a woman,”
unconstitutional. She reasoned that the
Argentine Constitution does not define
marriage as a contract between a man
and a woman and that Article 11 of the
Buenos Aires Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on gender, made
gender-based restrictions on marriage in
the national civil code unconstitutional.
Shortly after Seijas issued her judgment, lawyers from Buenos Aires sought
an injunction before national Judge Marta
Gómez Alsina that would prevent Freyre
and di Bello from marrying in Buenos
Aires. Gómez disagreed with Seija’s interpretation of the civil code, opining that
determinations on the legality of marriage
should be left to the legislature and issued
the injunction as a precautionary measure
because she claimed that Seija did not
have the authority — as a member of the
judiciary — to change the national civil
code. Gómez argued that the ability to alter
the civil code is a legislative action that
remains exclusively with the national congress. Seija noted in her opinion, however,
that her decision did not affect Argentina
as a whole, but only the people of Buenos
Aires, where her court has jurisdiction.
Activists in Mexico City, on the other
hand, took a legislative rather than a judicial approach. Representatives voted in
December 2009 to change the city’s civil
code, which previously defined marriage
as a union between a man and a woman,
to simply defining marriage as a union
between two people. Despite opposition
from the Catholic Church, lawmakers in
Mexico City passed this and other progressive legislation, including a bill legalizing abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy.
Mexico’s left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) led the legislative
assembly in revising the civil code by a
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vote of 39 to 20 with five abstentions.
Opposition party leaders from the National
Action Party (PAN), President Calderon’s
party, say they will contest the revision.
The statute only applies to marriage within
Mexico City. None of Mexico’s states have
passed similar amendments to their civil
codes.
Although harder to achieve, Mexico
City’s legislation assures same-sex couples
the right to marry, whereas attempting to
legalize gay-marriage through a judicial
opinion has had disappointing results in
Argentina. The legislative approach codifies the right to same-sex marriage and
makes it a right for all. Mexico City’s bold
action should be commended and taken as
an example by its neighbors throughout the
Americas.
Tracey Begley, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers Latin
America for the Human Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana’s Oldest Residents
May Resort to ICJ, Claiming
Government Is Flouting Their
Legally Protected Right to
Tribal Lands
The Bushmen are the oldest inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa, with ancestors
dating back some 20,000 years. Despite
their constitutionally protected right to
live and hunt on the Central Kalahari
Game Reserve (CKGR), the government
of Botswana continues to deny the Bushmen the right to access water and hunt on
the land.
On January 18, 2010, Roy Sesana, leader
of the First People of the Kalahari, declared
that peace talks with Botswana’s president
Ian Khama were unsuccessful and that the
Bushmen are ready to take their case to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The
ICJ has authority under the United Nations
Charter to issue advisory opinions to states
regarding human rights violations. In order
to pursue such an advisory opinion, the UN
Secretary-General or another authorized
organization would have to file a request
on behalf of the Bushmen. Sesana accuses
the government of ignoring the 2006 High
Court decision that granted the Bushmen
the right to live, hunt, and access water on
the CKGR. Attempts to resolve the conflict

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7
in domestic courts have also failed, after
the government violated the 2006 ruling
and failed to comply with subsequent rulings concerning livestock confiscation and
hunting permits.
The Bushmen reside in the CKGR,
which was created in 1961 to protect their
traditional lands and to help preserve the
wildlife. However, after diamonds were
discovered on the reserve in the 1980s,
major conflicts developed between the
Bushmen and the government, which many
claim has tried to clear the Bushmen off
the land in order to allow diamond miners
freer access. Land evictions in 1997, 2002,
and 2005 pushed almost all the Bushmen
on the Kalahari Reserve off their lands
into resettlement camps. To force people to
relocate, the government also dismantled
the Mothomelo water borehole inside the
CKGR and stopped delivering water to
Bushmen who lived in more distant areas
on the reserve. Without access to the borehole or the water deliveries, the Bushmen
could no longer survive on the CKGR.
In 2006, after the longest and most
expensive court case in Botswana’s history,
the split High Court ruled that the government’s actions in evicting the Bushmen
were “unlawful and unconstitutional” and
ordered it to allow the Bushmen to return
to their land and have access to water
and hunting permits. The swing vote was
delivered by Judge Mpaphi Phumaphi,
who stated that stopping food rations and
depriving the Bushmen of hunting licenses
was equivalent to condemning them to
“death by starvation.” The ruling ordered
the government to comply with Article 14
of Botswana’s constitution, which protects
the Bushmen and allows them to live freely
in the reserve.
Since the 2006 landmark decision,
Botswana’s government has evaded the ruling and made it almost impossible for the
Bushmen to live peacefully in the reserve.
Over fifty Bushmen have been arrested
since the court ruling for attempting to
hunt inside the reserve. Despite the court’s
holding that Bushmen have a legally protected right to hunt inside the CKGR,
Roy Blackbeard, the High Commissioner
from Botswana to the United Kingdom,
recently compared allowing the Bushmen
to hunt for food to feed their families
with allowing people to kill animals at
the London National Zoo. Additionally,
Dikgakgamatso Seretse, the Minister of

Defense, Justice, and Security agreed that
denying the Bushmen the ability to hunt
was unconstitutional, but maintained that
the Bushmen do not have automatic rights
to hunt and must rather apply for permits.
However, since 2001 the government has
denied every Bushmen who has applied for
a Special Game License to hunt.
Since the Bushmen returned to the
CKGR after the 2006 ruling, the government has denied them access to the
boreholes they previously used for water,
forcing them to travel 300 miles to collect
water for their communities. Of the Bushmen who have been brave enough to return
to their land, at least one person has died
from dehydration. The government consistently claims that its actions are based on
environmental concerns and that boreholes
should only be used for wildlife. However,
a safari company was recently allowed
to build a swimming pool on the reserve
at a tourist lodge supposedly designed to
give visitors a true “Bushman experience.”
Tiffany and Co. is also partnering with
the Botswana’s government to build new
boreholes on the CKGR for the exclusive
use of wildlife. Not only has the government explicitly refused to let the Bushmen
access these new boreholes, it has further
denied the Bushmen the right to drill a
borehole at their own expense. The government has also said that Gem Diamonds, a
company which is in the process of being
approved for mining, will be able to drill
boreholes to clean diamonds, a process that
requires billions of gallons of water.
Water and access to the CKGR are
crucial to the Bushmen’s survival and the
continuation of their way of life. The government is flagrantly violating the ruling
of its own judicial body by continuing to
discriminate against the Bushmen and deny
them access to water. It is now up to the
international community to rebuke the government of Botswana and make it conform
to its own law.

South African Farmers Sue
Zimbabwean Government over
Farm Seizures
Three white South African farm owners, Louis Fick, Michael Campbell, and
Richard Etheredge, are poised to challenge
Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform program in South Africa’s High Court of Pretoria. The week of January 22, 2010, the
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civil rights group AfriForum filed papers
on behalf of the farmers against Zimbabwe, challenging its defiance of a 2008
Southern African Development Community (SADC) decision that the Zimbabwean
land reform program violated international
law and was racially discriminatory. The
case is scheduled to begin on February 23,
2010 and could lead to the Zimbabwean
government’s assets in South Africa being
attached so that farm owners can recover
some of their losses. The farmers’ attorney,
Willie Spies, stated that if the case succeeds, it would set a precedent for other
dispossessed farmers to claim damages for
lost property in South African courts.
Since 2000, Zimbabwean president
Robert Mugabe has implemented a land
reform program that has displaced approximately 4,200 white farmers and affected
up to 60,000 workers and their families.
In late 2009, Zimbabwe and South Africa
signed the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements, which
South African government officials promised would protect South African interests
under the land seizure program. However,
evictions have actually increased since the
agreement was signed, with at least seventeen farms affected in January 2010 alone.
So far, South African government officials
have denied requests to use the agreement
to protect their citizens’ property rights,
stating that the agreement is unenforceable until it is ratified by the Zimbabwean
parliament.
Section 16B of Zimbabwe’s constitution provides that “no compensation shall
be payable” for land that is forcibly taken
for agricultural settlement and land reorganization. Even though SADC declared
the provision illegal in 2008, the Zimbabwean government has continued to seize
land without paying the former owners.
On January 26, 2010, Justice Bharat Patel
of Zimbabwe’s High Court declared that,
while Zimbabwe would normally recognize SADC judgments, this ruling directly
contradicts Zimbabwe’s constitution and is
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
The violence and lawlessness of aggressive land takeovers in Zimbabwe is alarming. At least eighteen people have been
murdered during violent evictions since
2000. As recently as December 2009, farm
owner Don Stewart was strangled and
burnt to death in his home. On January 12,
2010, the Smit family was locked inside
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their home for over a week without water
or electricity while a mob, bussed to the
farm by a government official, camped
outside and demanded that that the family give up its property. A November 2009
report by a coalition of Zimbabwean agricultural organizations claims that during
land evictions, 65 percent of dispossessed
farmers have been tortured according to
the United Nations Convention against
Torture definition.

Turkish Constitutional Court
Bans Kurdish Political Party,
Turkey’s Largest Minority Group
Loses Its Political Voice

Although many takeovers are orchestrated by high-ranking officials in Mugabe’s
government, the land evictions are controversial even within the government. In
April 2009, after a farm was seized and
given to President Mugabe’s biographer,
the Zimbabwean deputy prime minister,
Arthur Mutambara, denounced the takeover and demanded the farm be returned.
Although his demands were disregarded
and the former owners were chased off the
land, Mutambara continued to argue that
land takeovers scare off foreign investors
and lead to economic instability.

Thousands of protestors took to the
streets in southeast Turkey after the Turkish
Constitutional Court announced its decision to ban the Democratic Society Party
(DTP) on December 11, 2009. The DTP
was the only legally recognized pro-Kurdish party in Turkey; Kurds make up about
twenty percent of the Turkish population.
Officers used pressurized water and gas
bombs to quell the protests in the Hakkari
Province which continued for days after the
initial announcement. The DTP is the 27th
political party to be banned by the Turkish
Constitutional Court.

Mutambara is not alone in contending
that the economy has suffered because of
land reform. The Commercial Farmers
Union (CFU) claims the land reform program has led to non-productivity of eighty
percent of formally cultivated land, leading
to a U.S. $12 billion loss in agricultural
production over ten years. The United
Nations Famine Early Warning System
Network has also reported that between
January and March of 2010, 2.2 million
Zimbabweans may be in need of food
assistance. CFU blames the food shortages
on the dramatic decrease in food production since the land takeovers began in 2000
— a logical conclusion considering there
has only been one drought since the initiation of the land reform campaign.

Along with banning the party, the Court
also barred 37 party members from participating in politics for five years. It justified
its decision by citing violations of the Law
of the Political Parties and Articles 68 and
69 of the Turkish constitution. These articles state that political parties shall be permanently dissolved if they are in conflict
with the indivisible integrity of Turkey’s
territory or incite citizens to commit crime.
The Court accused the DTP of connections
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
a party that was banned and has since been
considered a terrorist-separatist group by
the Turkish government. The chairman of
the Court, Hasim Kilic, stated that the
party was banned because “it had become
a focal point of the activities against the
country’s integrity.”

Even if AfriForum wins the current litigation in South Africa, evictions of commercial farms are unlikely to stop: of the
three hundred still operating in Zimbabwe,
152 are already being targeted. However,
the ruling could find Zimbabwean officials in contempt of South African law if
they refused to appear in court or pay any
judgments, and may provide dispossessed
farmers with an avenue to receive compensation for land that has been taken from
them. Considering that the government
ignored the SADC ruling and domestic
court decisions, this may be the most effective remedy farmers can expect.

Caitlin Shay, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, covers Sub-Saharan
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

ish population. Prime Minister Erdogan
criticized the Court’s ruling, arguing that
individuals should be punished for their
activities rather than entire political parties.

Middle East and North Africa

The Laws of the Political Parties and the
Court’s trend of banning parties have also
been extensively criticized by the European Union. Turkey has been vying for EU
membership since 1987. The Venice Commission on the Council of Europe and the
European Convention on Human Rights
both dictate that parties can only be banned
for inciting violence. In the case of the
DTP, there has been no evidence that any of
its members have promoted violence in any
of their political activities, which makes
the Court’s decision in violation of Articles
10 and 11 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, to which Turkey is party.
The Court’s unanimous decision to ban the
DTP not only threatens the possibility of
Turkey’s EU membership but also allows
for further violations of the freedom of
expression and democracy.

This decision will harm recent efforts
by the Turkish government to improve
relations with the Kurdish community. As
recently as November 2009, the first Turkish Foreign Minister entered the Kurdish
region of northern Iraq since the birth of
the Republic, the government announced
proposals to reduce the sentences of boys
associated with the PKK, and members of
the PKK offered themselves to the Turkish
authorities as a symbol of peace. These
were considered to be important steps
in improving the Turkish government’s
relationship with its considerable Kurd44

Gaza Caged
On January 20, 2010, the UN Aid and
Association for International Development
Agencies called for the immediate opening
of Gaza’s borders in light of the escalating
crisis that threatens the area. In direct contravention to this request, Gaza’s borders
will soon be further blocked. Early this
year, Israel announced plans to build a wall
on its southern border, and Palestinians
protested the construction of another wall
that Egypt has just begun to build on its
Rafah border. With the completion of these
two walls, Egypt and Israel will have effectively caged off the Gaza strip, preventing
Palestinians in Gaza from leaving and
keeping out the supplies that are smuggled
through the border.
It has been a year since Egypt was
harshly criticized for closing its border
to Palestinians desperate to escape during Israel’s offensive against Gaza in the
winter of 2008 to 2009; the construction of
this wall is drawing the same kind of criticisms. Egyptian officials have explained
that the wall is necessary to defend Egypt’s
national security, but it is widely understood that the wall is intended to halt
the smuggling that occurs underneath its
borders every day. The steel wall is to run
one hundred feet deep, blocking the estimated 400 tunnels that run underneath the
Egyptian-Gaza border.
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Israel too, for the purposes of national
security, is building a wall on its southern
border. In addition, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the
wall is intended to protect the “Jewish
character of the state.” Thousands of African migrants cross the border from Egypt
into Israel every year, many of whom are
asylum seekers, hailing from Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Sudan. The journey to Israel
is often very perilous; seventeen African
migrants have been ordered shot at the border by Egyptian security since May 2009.
These walls suggest the possibility of
serious humanitarian problems. Once completed, the two walls will indirectly link
up near Rafah, Egypt; it is speculated that
eventually the whole Gaza strip will be surrounded by one single wall. Caging in the
Gaza strip will likely foster an explosive
atmosphere among residents. There have
already been casualties associated with the
project, as violent protests have erupted
along the site of the walls.
Since the Israeli blockade began in
2007, Gazans have come to rely on the
U.S. $1 million worth of goods smuggled
through the tunnels every day. The blockade limits basic necessities like food, medical supplies, construction, and fuel from
entering Gaza. With no other option, these
same goods must be smuggled through the
tunnels. The tunnels have helped deter a
humanitarian crisis for those isolated on
the 360 square kilometer strip. By blocking
the tunnels, Egypt will be denying Palestinians the goods they desperately need.
Further, the aim of these protective
measures may fail to prevent and, instead,
exacerbate the existing problems. Migrants
are likely to continue trying to enter Israel
through more perilous routes, and smugglers may try to construct deeper tunnels.
Israel has international obligations under
Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to ensure that residents in Gaza
have access to food and medical supplies.
With the construction of these walls, not
only are Israel and Egypt evading their
international obligations, but the walls may
lead to more problems by forcing people
to seek desperate schemes to obtain relief.

and Accountability Commission to ban
more than 500 individuals from participating in the March 7 elections. This decision
quickly undermined the hope for free and
democratic elections sparked when an Iraqi
appeals court suspended the voting ban on
February 3. Candidates had just three days
to appeal the decision; only 177 actually
exercised that right, and just 28 of them
were granted permission to participate in
the elections. The original ban, announced
in January, was widely protested domestically and internationally. Most of those
blacklisted come from the Sunni community, including fifteen political parties,
popular Sunni politicians, and original
drafters of the Iraqi constitution. The most
recent confirmation of this decision may
exacerbate the country’s unstable political climate, which has been rocked with
sectarian violence for the past seven years.
The constitutionality of the original ban
is dubious. The standards that were used
to bar participation were not transparent,
and the commissioners involved had yet
to be approved by the Iraqi parliament,
as required by law. Beyond the domestic
legality issue, Iraq has an international
obligation under Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to allow its citizens to freely elect
their representatives. Most Sunni Arabs
boycotted the parliamentary elections in
2005. As a result, there is a disproportionately high representation of Shiite and
Kurdish Iraqis in the Council of Representatives; approximately 35 percent of Iraqis
are Sunni but they comprise less than 20
percent of members of the Council of
Representatives. Because of the boycott,
many Sunni leaning electors did not have
the opportunity to elect prominent Sunni
candidates.

After Hesitation, Iraq Election
Ban Is Reinstated

The Commission’s decision is an extension of its overall de-Baathification efforts.
The policy, first promoted by U.S. administrator of Iraq Paul Bremer, was implemented in an effort to erase all traces of
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Its initiatives
included the dissolution of all branches of
the Iraqi government that were Baathist in
nature and the implementation Article 7 of
the Iraq Constitution, which bars political
parties that promote Baathism. Most of the
candidates and parties that were banned
had ties to the pre-2003 Baath party.

On February 13, 2010, Iraqi officials
confirmed the decision by the Iraqi Justice

The de-Baathification process has been
criticized by human rights proponents, who
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argue that it punishes individuals who were
innocently associated with or obligated to
join the Baath party. Not joining meant
forfeiting basic employment, health, and
education rights because the party was the
political entity promoted by the authoritarian government of Saddam Hussein. Most
members were teachers and administrative
figures with virtually no ties to Saddam
Hussein or his politics. The ban further
isolates Sunnis in an already polarized
political system.
The March elections are considered
a litmus test for the national reconciliation process. Since the announcement, a
Sunni female suicide bomber killed 54
and wounded 117 Shiites on pilgrimage in
Iraq; most recently on February 3, another
Sunni suicide bomber killed twenty Shia
pilgrims. If recent events are an indicator
for the future of reconciliation, the court’s
decision may escalate the sectarian tensions that already plague the country.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, covers North Africa
and the Middle East for the Human Rights
Brief.

Europe
Russia Promotes Justice by
Ratifying Protocol 14 of
European Court of Human Rights
With a vote of 392 to 56, Russia’s parliament, the Duma, ratified Protocol 14
to the European Court on Human Rights
(ECtHR) on January 15, 2010. The Protocol is part of a new set of reforms aimed to
streamline the work of the ECtHR. Since
2006, Russia has been the only state out
of 47 in the Council of Europe (CoE) to
oppose Protocol 14. The reforms are a
response to the growing backlog of cases
in the ECtHR, partly due to the ongoing
ascension of Eastern European countries
to the European Union. Although many of
the reforms proposed by Protocol 14 have
already been implemented by most of the
CoE Member States through the adoption
of an interim protocol last year, Russian
late ratification allows the Court to implement faster and simpler procedures.
In 2006, President Vladimir Putin sent
Protocol 14 to the Duma for review, but
concerns over the Russian Federation’s
national interest and sovereignty proved
obstacles to ratification. According to
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Aleksei V. Makarkin, a leading analyst at
the Center for Political Technologies, a
Moscow policy research group, Russia’s
decision to ratify Protocol 14 was brought
on by a change in atmosphere in the capital. Makarkin suggests that “[Russia] no
longer [has] the feeling that Europe wants
to build revolutions here.”
European ministers’ recognition of Russian complaints regarding the reforms also
prompted Russia to ratify Protocol 14. One
of the conditions set by Russia before ratifying the Protocol was a guarantee that one
out of three judges presiding over cases at
the ECtHR will be a national of the state
against which the legal claim is brought.
This means that at least one Russian judge
will review complaints against the Federation. As a result of this compromise,
the ECtHR cannot investigate complaints
before cases are formally accepted by Russian judges, and the ECtHR could not adopt
new powers to force the implementation of
the court’s rulings. This compromise was
needed because, without Russia’s acceptance of the reforms, the CoE was powerless. However, no changes were made to
the Protocol itself during the CoE’s negotiations with Russia.
The implications of this ratification
are numerous. First, it will streamline the
workload encumbering the ECtHR. Up
to this point, failure to ratify the Protocol
meant that it took approximately four to
five years to process a case, which is significant given that one-third of the cases
pending are either from Russia or implicate
Russia in some way. Protocol 14 reforms
aimed at simplifying the procedures of
the Court include: screening applications
through a national court before proceeding
to the ECtHR, having one judge decide
the admissibility of a case, and merging
multiple complaints against the same state
in certain circumstances. Although new
procedures will not resolve all problems
resulting from the flood of applications to
the Court, they will promote efficiency.
Second, the ratification is an important
step in strengthening the Court’s role in
upholding human rights across Europe
and providing all Europeans with better
access to justice through the Court. Third,
Protocol 14 enables the CoE Committee of
Ministers to bring states before the ECtHR
for failing to implement the Court’s judgments. For this reason, ratification of the
Protocol could force Russia to implement

ECtHR judgments on abuses in Chechnya.
In more than 115 rulings, the Court found
Russian officials responsible for the disappearances of human rights activists, extrajudicial executions, and torture. Although
Russia paid monetary compensation to the
families of the victims, as required by the
ECtHR, it failed to effectively investigate
these crimes and hold the perpetrators
criminally accountable.
For instance on July 15, 2009, the leading human rights activist in Chechnya,
Natalia Estemirova, was kidnapped and
murdered. Less than a month later, Zarema
Sadulayeva and her husband Alik Dzhabrailov, activists for the Save the Generation
organization in Chechnya, were kidnapped
from their office and found murdered the
next day. In total, four Chechen human
rights activists were killed in 2009, and
their murders have yet to be effectively
investigated and prosecuted. The ratification of Protocol 14 brings hope that crimes
in Chechnya will not go unpunished.
Finally, the Federation views this ratification as a step toward improving the
entire legal system in Russia. The potential overhaul of Russia’s legal system is
also evidenced by the recent ratification
of Protocol 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which implements
a moratorium on the death penalty in the
Federation. However, only time will tell if
Russia will comply with the terms of the
Protocol and will not use its negotiations
with the CoE to thwart the justice system in
Europe. Russia’s decision to ratify Protocol
14 also comes on the eve of an important
ministerial conference to discuss the future
development of the Court, to be held in
Interlaken, Switzerland, on February 18
and 19, 2010.

Landmark Rendition Trial in Italy
In a landmark ruling on November 4,
2009, Italy’s highest court gave verdicts
on the 2003 abduction of Egyptian-born
cleric Mustafa Osama Nasr, known as Abu
Omar. On February 17, 2003, Nasr was
abducted as part of an extraordinary rendition operation between the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian
Military Intelligence and Security Service
(SISMI) while he was walking to a mosque
in Milan, Italy. Under investigation by
the Italian police, Nasr was suspected of
recruiting militants for Iraq. The CIA flew
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Nasr to Egypt where they tortured him with
electric shocks, beatings, genital abuse,
and threats of rape. Although the Italian
court issued indictments against the defendants in June 2005, the case was slowed by
the Prodi and Berlusconi administrations,
which were concerned with maintaining
friendly Italian-American relations.
Of the 26 CIA operatives tried in absentia, 23 including U.S. Air Force Lt. Col.
Joseph Romano were convicted by the
Italian court, while three were protected by
diplomatic immunity. Robert Seldon Lady,
the CIA station chief in Milan at the time
of the kidnapping, received an eight-year
sentence, while 21 other former agents
each received five years. The Milan court
also found that two Italian officials were
complicit in the CIA abuses and sentenced
them to three years in prison. The court
also ruled that those convicted must pay
€1 million (U.S. $1.5 million) in damages to Abu Omar and €500,000 to his
wife. The judge refrained from providing a
verdict against five of the seven Italians on
trial, as a result of a March 2009 ruling by
the Italian Constitutional Court that interpreted the state secrecy doctrine to provide
broad protections and served to block evidence against them in the trial.
Joanna Mariner, Human Rights Watch
(HRW) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Director, criticized the United States and
Italy for using the state secrecy doctrine to
provide diplomatic immunity guarantees to
government officials responsible for gross
human rights abuses. Nevertheless, HRW
stated that the verdicts “[mark] a historic
legal challenge to the CIA’s rendition program.” This is this first time CIA operatives have faced a criminal trial for the use
of extraordinary rendition, a controversial
anti-terrorism program expanded by the
George W. Bush administration. According to Italian prosecutor Armando Spataro,
this verdict sends a clear message to all
governments “that even in the fight against
terrorism you can’t forsake the basic rights
of our democracies.”
As all of the American defendants were
tried in absentia, they are now considered fugitives under Italian law. Spataro
confirmed that the American CIA operatives are only subject to arrest in Europe,
because the Italian government refused to
send the request to arrest and to extradite
the fugitives to Interpol or U.S. authorities.
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Most importantly, the verdicts call on
the Obama administration to follow Italy’s
lead in prosecuting other officials who
were involved in the program. Although
the Obama administration launched an
investigation into the CIA’s abusive interrogation techniques in 2009, it has not
focused on the U.S. rendition program.
The CIA has not commented on any of the
allegations surrounding Abu Omar, and
a spokesperson for the State Department
said, “We are disappointed by the verdicts.”
It is uncertain whether the CIA operatives
have any recourse in the United States
following their guilty verdicts in Italian
court, since the Italian judge has ignored
requests to move Lt. Col. Romano’s case
to the United States. On the other hand,
Sabrina De Sousa, an American defendant,
sued the State Department in federal court
for diplomatic immunity. In an American
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) interview with Dan Ross, De Sousa acknowledged that “[c]learly, we broke a law, and
we’re paying for the mistakes right now of
whoever authorized and approved this.”
She then criticized the U.S. government,
stating, “I was assigned as a representative
of this Government, and I should have been
protected.” She plans to amend her lawsuit
to include Jeffrey Castelli, Robert Seldon
Lady, and the CIA as defendants because
they were responsible for the abduction.
De Sousa denies involvement in Nasr’s
rendition.
In light of the verdict dismissing a
suit brought by Canadian rendition victim
Maher Arar on November 2, 2009 by a
U.S. federal appellate court in New York,
the United States is unlikely to enforce
the recent Italian ruling. However, the EU
arrest warrants issued against the 22 defendants renders them subject to the threat
of arrest outside the United States for the
rest of their lives. One thing is for certain:
the outcome of the Italian court verdict
increases pressure on the Obama administration to re-evaluate its rendition program.
Annamaria Racota, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers Europe
for the Human Rights Brief.

South and Central Asia
Breakthrough for Eunuch Rights
in Pakistan
Eunuchs in Pakistan received muchneeded support from the unlikely source of
the Pakistani Supreme Court, giving many
hope for future improvements. In June
2009, the Court ordered provincial governments to conduct a survey of all eunuchs
in the country. The term eunuch, as used
in most of South Asia, describes those who
fall outside of socially-accepted sexual
norms: intersexuals, transsexuals, gay men,
and men who have not fully developed.
The Supreme Court’s move came after
Dr. Mohammad Aslam Khaki filed a petition seeking to establish a commission to
create greater equality for eunuchs and
effeminate men who are generally treated
harshly in Pakistani society. Dr. Khaki
began advocating for better treatment of
eunuchs after a police raid led to the
arrest of several transvestites in Taxila,
in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Dr. Khaki
found the group’s living conditions to be
among the worst of any minority group
in the country and that most eunuchs in
Pakistan make their living through dancing, begging, and prostitution. According
to the petition, parents of transvestite or
transgender children commonly give them
to eunuch leaders, who train them in one
of these occupations. The petition also
detailed the social hardships many eunuchs
face: living in slums; denial of basic civil
rights such as inheritance; and exclusion
from public facilities and transportation.
Many eunuchs also experience physical
and financial abuse from gangsters, police,
and even their own families.
The court-ordered survey required the
social welfare departments of provincial
governments to gather information, including the population of eunuchs in Pakistan,
the status of facilities available to them, the
nature of offenses committed against them
as children, and the reasons parents are
giving them up at birth. The detailed results
were compiled in a report submitted to the
Supreme Court.
In July 2009, after reviewing the
requested report and hearing the testimony
of eunuch witnesses, the Supreme Court
ruled that eunuchs are entitled to the same
benefits and protections available to all
Pakistani citizens. The Court ordered the
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provincial governments to ensure their
security, work to curtail police abuse, and
offer them provincial financial aid programs and NGO welfare programs. The
Court showed compassion for the plight
of the Pakistani eunuchs, who live what it
considered “a life of shame.” The Justices
also lamented the discrimination practiced
by parents against their own children.
In November 2009, the Supreme Court
held a hearing to review the implementation of the July decision. At the hearing,
the Court directed the Pakistani federal and
provincial governments to hold meetings to
determine how to fulfill the requirements
of the ruling. During the hearing, Chief
Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry suggested possible mechanisms to address
the issues facing eunuchs, including a
job quota system and the involvement of
federal agencies such as the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).
The Chief Justice also suggested a meeting between representatives of provincial
governments, the federal government, and
NGOs as the next step in resolving the
problem.
After the provinces were given time to
comply with these directives, the Supreme
Court issued a final order in mid-December that identified eunuchs as a distinct
gender. The order also established that
eunuchs are entitled to their inherited
property and assigned Pakistan’s Social
Welfare Department to oversee the task.
In addition to other reforms, the Election Commission was directed to register
eunuchs in electoral rolls.
The Court’s orders are yet to be fully
implemented, but the support of the
Supreme Court is a welcome change to the
ostracization eunuchs have faced for years.
It is an important victory and a chance for
a better future for the eunuch community
of Pakistan.

Release of Child Soldiers: A
Good Sign for the Nepalese Peace
Process
The ten-year conflict between Maoist
rebels and the government of Nepal, which
ended in 2006, resulted in many human
rights abuses, not the least among them
the use of child soldiers by the Maoist
rebels. According to human rights organizations, Maoists forcibly took children
from schools and persuaded them to fight
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against the government during the civil
war.
In early January 2010, 155 former child
soldiers were released as civilians after
three years in UN-monitored detention
camps. These were the first of over 24,000
former Maoist fighters to be discharged
under the 2006 agreement, including 3,000
minor combatants and another 1,035 who
helped the Maoists in non-combatant roles.
By February 8, 2010, a total of 2,394 former child soldiers were released. Unlike
their adult counterparts who are to be
incorporated into the national military, former child soldiers who were under the age
of eighteen in 2006 were released to their
families and received rehabilitation packages that provide them with the opportunity to attend school or to learn new trades.
Their progress will be monitored by the
United Nations.
The discharge of former Maoist child
soldiers from detention camps is part of
an action plan agreed to in December
2009 by the United Nations, the Nepalese
government, and the Unified Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M). Once
the former child soldiers are released,
the UCPN-M will be removed from the
Secretary-General’s list of child soldier
recruiters.
The move is a momentous one in furthering the Nepalese peace process, which
reached a standstill in November 2009
after Maoists protested the president’s powers concerning the army. The UCPN-M
had originally refused the rehabilitation
plan, demanding financial packages for
the minors instead of educational and vocational training. The government refused
to alter the plan, however, fearing that
financial benefits would end up funding the People’s Liberation Army, aiding
them in recruiting former child soldiers
to join them instead of returning home.
After November’s tension, the UN envoy to
Nepal cited the release of the child soldiers
as an optimistic sign in the peace process.
The UN mandate responsible for facilitating negotiations thus far was to end
on January 23, 2010, but was extended
through May 15, 2010. The enormous task
of reintegration of former rebels, coupled
with the drafting of the national constitution and preparation for the elections to
follow, was presented to the UN Security
Council as evidence that Nepal needs addi-

tional help from the United Nations. The
release of child soldiers was just the first
of many steps necessary to ensure that the
peace process continues. Despite the initiation of the former child soldiers’ rehabilitation programs, there is no guarantee that
the peace process would continue without
further UN assistance.

Devout Azerbaijani Villagers
Arrested after Religious
Ceremony
More than a hundred Azerbaijani villagers were arrested in the village of Bananyar
in the Nakhchivan enclave on January 5,
2010. Initially, several arrests reportedly
took place the day after the Day of Ashura,
on which Shia Muslims mourn the death
of Muhammad’s grandson, in late December 2009. These detentions were allegedly
a reaction to the villagers’ performance
of ritual mourning practices on Ashura.
Those detained were subjected to interrogations and physical abuse by local security forces. Their detention inspired strong
protests from family members, including
one young man who set himself on fire in
an attempt to free his relatives.
After the initial arrest of several Ashura
participants, security forces returned during the night of January 5 and violently
arrested others thought to be responsible
for organizing the ceremony. The prisoners
were taken to the Interior Ministry headquarters and a pretrial detention center to
be questioned. Almost all of the prisoners
were released within a week of the arrests;
a few, however, were held in mental institutions and jails within the Nakhchivan
enclave.
Initially, the Nakhchivan Interior Minister denied the allegations of arrests, but
later admitted that arrests had been made.
The Minister blamed the opposition, the
Popular Front Party, and a mentally ill
villager for the trouble. Nakhchivan officials claimed that the young man who set
himself on fire was mentally ill and was
provoked by villagers, led by the leader of
the Popular Front Party, to threaten suicide
if closed kiosks were not reopened. Meanwhile, the head of the pretrial detention
center denied that any villagers were held
at his facility.
Less than one week after the clashes
between security forces and villagers led to
these arrests, Norwegian and U.S. Embassy
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officials were not allowed into the Bananyar village on a fact-finding trip. The trip
was halted by a group of neighboring villagers, allegedly organized by Nakhchivan
enclave authorities to deter the officials’
progress. Azerbaijani human rights groups
also requested official permission to enter
the area, but did not receive a response
from Nakhchivan authorities. Officials
from the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were able
to meet with activists in Baku, however, to
evaluate the situation.
The United States joined Norway on
January 14 in encouraging Azerbaijani
officials to investigate the events that led
to the detention of Shia Muslim worshippers. The joint statement, signed by the
two countries also expressed objections
to the access to Bananyar during their
fact-finding trip. Azerbaijan has already
been repeatedly accused of persecuting
devout Muslims, a practice which rights
groups attribute to the government’s fear of
Islamic influence in the country.
According to Human Rights Watch, new
laws instated in the last year in Azerbaijan are furthering restrictions on freedom
of conscience and religion. These laws
include a requirement that each religious
organization register with the government
and conduct its activities solely at its legal
address. In addition, organizations need
express permission from a government
agency, the State Committee for Work
with Religious Organizations, to publish
literature, and the organizations can only
be headed by Azerbaijani citizens educated
in the country. These restrictions violate
the norms of freedom of religion and
conscience practiced by other states in the
OSCE and the Council of Europe; Azerbaijan is a Member State of both. Azerbaijan
has come under increasing scrutiny for
restricting multiple basic freedoms; hopefully the events in the Nakhchivan enclave
are not a harbinger of more abuses to come.
Bhavani Raveendran, a J.D. candidate at
the Washington College of Law, covers
South and Central Asia for the Human
Rights Brief.
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East Asia
Uighur Protesters Sentenced
to Death
China’s far western Xinjiang province,
rich in oil and gas deposits, is home to the
Uighurs, one of China’s minority groups.
Representing less than one percent of
China’s total population but about forty
percent of the inhabitants of Xinjiang, the
Uighurs speak a Turkic language and are
predominately Muslim. The Uighurs have
continuously called for the region’s independence, referring to Xinjiang as “East
Turkistan” or “Uighuristan.” The Chinese
government, however, relies on the One
China Policy and opposes the region’s
autonomy, labeling the Uighurs as “antiChina forces.”
During the last few decades, a growing
population of Han Chinese, the majority
ethnic group in China, has moved into the
area, causing disruption and insecurity
in the Uighur community. The Uighurs
viewed the newcomers as a threat to their
jobs and traditional way of life, attempting
to crowd the Uighurs out of the region.
Before this influx of Han residents, more
than ninety percent of Xinjiang’s population was Uighur.
Tensions between Han Chinese and the
Uighurs, who had long complained of Chinese government’s repression, erupted into
deadly riots on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi,
the capital of Xinjiang province. Peaceful
demonstrations in reaction to the brutal
murders of two Uighur migrants working
in China’s Guangdong province in June
2009 escalated into a violent clash. While
the Uighurs argue that the police triggered the violence by responding harshly
to peaceful protests, Han Chinese allege
that Uighurs first attacked Han Chinese
and vandalized their shops. Official figures from the Chinese government reflect
at least 197 dead and more than 1,600
injured. However, Uighur exile groups
argue that Chinese police shot or beat to
death about 800 people.
The July riots forced many Uighurs to
leave the region and they have since been
issued “Persons of Concern” letters by the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
However, some remained in the region,
and over 1,000 people who allegedly participated in the violence were detained. As
of January 2010, 26 of those detained were

sentenced to death and at least nine of these
death sentences had been carried out.
Human rights groups and members of
the international community have condemned these executions, claiming that the
suspects were denied due process rights
and that the use of the death penalty far
exceeds international standards. Motivated
to impose political pressure on dissidents,
the Chinese government executed participants in the riots for “violent crimes of
attacking, smashing, looting and burning.”
Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) limits
the imposition of death sentences to the
“most serious crimes;” most countries that
utilize the death penalty impose it only for
very serious crimes such as murder, rape or
terrorism. China, however, has long been
the target of criticism for giving suspects
a “political verdict” and using the death
penalty as a tool for threatening those who
challenge social harmony.
Due to a lack of transparency in China’s legal system, questions remain as to
whether the accused had fair trials. While
the spokesperson for Xinjiang’s regional
government maintains that the media and
the family members of the accused had
access to the trials, Human Rights Watch
(HRW) contends that the trials were neither
publicly announced nor open to the public
and that the defendants were given less
than one day’s notice of the date of their
trials. HRW further alleges that the trials of
those involved in the July violence do not
meet “minimum standards for the administration of justice” because the Chinese
government threatened lawyers who began
independently investigating the violence,
denying suspects access to legal representation of their choice.
The lack of transparency in the trials of
those sentenced to death for participation
in the July demonstrations violates both
international and domestic standards of due
process. Under China’s criminal procedural
law, a suspect has the right to be appointed
a defender for both publicly and privately
prosecuted cases. Also, the ICCPR states
that “[a]ll persons . . . before the courts and
tribunals . . . shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing . . . .” Although China has
signed but not ratified the ICCPR, Chinese
law incorporates the internationally recognized principle of open trials established
by the ICCPR. Moreover, according to
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on
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the Law of Treaties (VCLT), as a signatory
to the ICCPR, China is “obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose” of the ICCPR. China has
not ratified the VCLT; although many of
the provisions of the VCLT are considered
customary international law and therefore
binding on all states, it remains unclear
whether this includes Article 18. To come
into compliance with its treaty obligations
and widely-accepted international legal
norms, China should afford fair trials to all
suspects involved in the July riots, regardless of their actual or suspected status as
political dissidents.

South Korea Grants Refugee
Status to Gay Pakistani Asylum
Seeker
Due in part to the strong cultural influence of Confucianism, South Korea is a
conservative society with a generally negative public perception of homosexuality. It
was not until 2000, when Korean celebrity
Seok-cheon Hong publicly announced that
he was gay, that the public began to actively
discuss LGBT issues. Despite such societal
changes as greater recognition and understanding of gays and lesbians, homosexuality in South Korea, as in many other Asian
countries, is still viewed as unusual and
unwelcome.
Recently, however, the Seoul Administrative Court granted refugee status to a
gay man facing persecution in Pakistan for
his sexual orientation. He fled from Pakistan to Korea in 1996 after family members
threatened to report his sexual orientation
to the police; he lived illegally in Korea
until he was caught last year by the agents
of the Korean Immigration Bureau. He
filed a petition for refugee status in February 2009, which was denied by the Ministry of Justice four months later. The Seoul
Administrative Court overturned the ruling
on the grounds that it is highly likely that
“the plaintiff will be subject to persecution
by the Pakistani government” if repatriated. Under the Pakistani Penal Code, “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”
is a crime punishable by a fine and possible
imprisonment of two years to life.
The Administrative Court’s decision has
generated a debate among South Koreans. Since it is the first time in Korean
history that sexual orientation has been
used as a basis for granting refugee status,
some question its legitimacy. South Korea
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became a State Party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol in 1992. Since then, 2,413 foreigners
have applied for refugee status in South
Korea. Only 145 applicants have been
granted asylum for racial, religious, and
political reasons.
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who,
“owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted,” cannot return to his own country. Moreover, Article 1A(2) lists several
grounds for persecution for which refugees
may be granted asylum: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. A particular social group is defined as a group
of people who share common immutable
characteristics other than risk of persecution, such as background, customs, or
social status. States such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden have for
some time accepted asylum claims based
on an individual’s sexual orientation as a
basis for membership in a particular social
group. These countries, among others, have
found that granting asylum on the grounds
of sexual orientation is in compliance with
the Refugee Convention.
Although the South Korean Supreme
Court must review the Administrative
Court’s holding before refugee status
will be granted, this decision is the first
acknowledgment of sexual orientation as
a valid basis for accepting asylum seekers
in South Korea, and reflects the changing
attitudes of South Korean society towards
gays and lesbians.

Child Abduction by Parents
in Japan
On January 30, 2010, ambassadors
from the United States and seven Western
nations met with Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada to urge Japan to address
its child custody issues; the current Japanese system enables parents who abduct
their children and interferes with the ability of divorced foreign parents to see their
children in Japan. International parental
child abduction occurs when a marriage
between nationals of different states fails
and one parent takes the child to another
country or detains the child in violation of
a custody or visitation order without the

consent of the other parent. In some cases,
the parent who is left behind cannot visit
the child because laws in the country where
the child has been taken provide protections to the abductors.
In most countries, divorced parents make a child custody arrangement,
detailing their legal rights over their children, including visitation and custodial
rights and responsibilities. Such custodial
arrangements, however, are unenforceable
in Japan, where the country’s Family Code
only recognizes sole custody and does not
provide visitation rights for noncustodial
parents. Divorced Japanese parents can
bring their children to Japan in violation of
custody or visitation arrangements made
in a foreign country and face no repercussions. If the abducting spouse refuses to
have contact with their former spouse, the
foreign parent ultimately loses access to
his or her children. As a result, some critics
have called Japan an “international haven
for child abduction.” Moreover, activist
groups such as the Assembly for French
Overseas Nationals for Japan estimate that
as many as 10,000 children with dual citizenship in Japan are unable to contact their
foreign parents.
As international marriages and divorce
rates increase, the number of parental child
abductions crossing international borders
also continues to grow. According to 2010
statistics released by the U.S. Embassy in
Japan, the number of parental child abduction cases in Japan almost doubled between
2007 and 2009. The longstanding child
custody problems in Japan gained international attention last year when an American
father, Christopher Savoie, was arrested by
Japanese police after he attempted to take
his two children to the U.S. Consulate in
Fukuoka, Japan. Savoie alleged that his
ex-wife, Noriko, illegally removed their
children from the United States without
his knowledge. Upon the couple’s divorce
in Tennessee, a court granted custody of
the two children to Noriko and gave Christopher visitation rights. Despite her agreement to stay in the United States, Noriko
fled to Japan with the two children. After
spending over two weeks in jail, Savoie
was released on the condition that he would
not take his children back to the United
States.
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction
protects parental rights of access to their
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children by providing a legal mechanism
for returning a child wrongfully removed
from their country of habitual residence.
Japan is the only industrialized nation in
the Group of Seven that has not ratified
the Convention and the ambassadors from
the eight Western countries urged Japan to
sign the Convention, emphasizing that for
their welfare, children should have access
to both parents.
The Japanese government regards its
decision not to sign the Convention as a
protection for Japanese women and children fleeing from abusive relationships
with foreign nationals. Japanese Foreign
Minister Katsuya Okada, however, recently
announced that Japan will review the Convention, a sign that Japan may be considering a policy change. Whether or not
Japan ultimately signs the Convention, the
country must address the growing issue of
international parental child abduction disputes in order to guarantee parental rights
and to assure that custodial arrangements
are made to serve the best interests of the
children.
Ri Yoo, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers East Asia for the
Human Rights Brief.

Southeast Asia and Oceania
Vietnamese Buddhist Monks and
Nuns Driven into Hiding
Several hundred members of the Buddhist Bat Nha monastery, followers of
internationally-renowned monk Thich
Naht Hahn, have been driven into hiding,
illustrating Vietnam’s continued failure to
respect religious freedom. The monks and
nuns left the Phuoc Hue pagoda in Vietnam’s central Lam Dong province, where
they have been seeking sanctuary since
September 2009, after government sponsored mobs forcibly removed them from
Bat Nha. In December 2009, a mob of
nearly 200 people, many of whom were
reportedly bused in from distant provinces
and paid by the government to protest the
pagoda, dragged the Phuoc Hue abbot from
his room and forced him to sign an agreement that the sheltered monks and nuns
would leave the pagoda and return to their
home provinces by December 31. In the
days leading up to the deadline, the monks
and nuns left Phuoc Hue and dispersed into
an underground network of sympathetic
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laypeople, with a few dozen likely heading
to Thailand and France.
Thich Naht Hahn, currently in exile in
France, founded the Bat Nha monastery
in 2005 while returning to Vietnam for
the first time since his 1966 exile. The
monastery is part of the Unified Buddhist
Church of Vietnam (UBCV), an illegal
organization of Buddhists sects, temples
and monasteries acting as a progressive
alternative to the government-controlled
Vietnam Buddhist Church (VBC). Since
its formation, the UBCV, and especially
Bat Nha, have experienced considerable
harassment from both the Vietnamese government and traditional Buddhists, critical
of the UBCV’s progressive approach. In
June 2009, a mob of VBC monks burned
the homes of nuns and beat several monks
at the monastery. According to eyewitnesses, police made no effort to stop the
violence.
Although Vietnam’s constitution and
the 2004 Ordinance Regarding Religious
Belief and Religious Organization provide for freedom of religion, in practice
the highly centralized Communist government retains tight controls on all religious activities. The Office of Religious
Affairs officially sanctions and oversees
all religious activity in the country. Even
state-registered religious groups, including
many Buddhist and Christian sects, must
give up considerable autonomy and allow
government control over clerical appointments and other internal issues.
Unofficial religious groups, like the
UBCV and the neo-Buddhist sect Hoa
Hao, however, remain in constant standoff
with the government. These groups are not
allowed to operate educational and training centers or places of worship. National
and local security officers have used their
broad powers to monitor and detain citizens
in order to harass and imprison leaders of
unofficial sects. Additionally, the government often pressures ethnic minorities to
convert from their traditional religion to a
state-sponsored religion.
Although the monks and nuns of Bat
Nha have been driven underground, they
remain committed to practicing their faith
and serving their communities. Sister Natasha, a nun at Thich Naht Hahn’s monastery
in France, says that the hiding monks and
nuns “are undeterred from their path, even
though they must practice underground.”

A delegation of monks and nuns from
Thich Naht Hahn’s monastery petitioned
the French government for temporary asylum for the Bat Nha members. Asylum has
not been yet granted.

Treating Addiction through Force
Drug users in Cambodia are subject
to arbitrary arrest and commitment to
drug treatment facilities, but in a startling
development, may now also be unwilling
participants in an experimental drug trial.
In December 2009, police in Phnom Penh
reportedly arrested at least seventeen drug
users and forced them into a drug trial
for the experimental herbal formula Bong
Sen at the military run “drug treatment
center” Orksas Knyom. Bong Sen is an
unlicensed treatment for opiate addiction,
which according to its Vietnamese manufacturer Ben Tre Fataco, has no side effects
and enables addicts to recover in five to
ten days.
Local and international NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, have expressed
significant concern over the Bong Sen trials. In addition to the potentially coercive
recruitment tactics, these trials were not
subject to the Ministry of Health’s ethical
review process. Other ethical problems
include a lack of informed consent, or safeguards for the health of participants. Moreover, after treatment, the detainees were
released with no opportunity for follow-up
care or counseling. Local NGOs estimate
the relapse rate of drug users released from
Orksas Knyom to be around 100 percent.
If these claims are true, the trials run
contrary to the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, the definitive statement of ethical principles for
human medical research. The Declaration
mandates, among other things, that all
human research undergo review by an
ethics committee, that free and informed
consent be obtained from each subject, and
that the subject be able to withdraw participation at any point in the process.
Cambodia vehemently denies the claims
made by NGOs. Cambodia’s National
Authority for Combating Drugs, a collaborator in the trials, insists that Bong
Sen is not a drug but an herbal treatment,
and as such is not subject to the same ethical review procedures. Additionally, the
government denies the assertions that the
trials were involuntary, maintaining that all
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participants consented to the trial and that
the treatment was effective.
In the past, the Cambodian government has been hesitant to allow drug
trials on its citizens, and even halted an
HIV drug trial for human rights concerns.
This time, however, the government has
an interest in permitting the trials. With
considerable financial and technical support from Vietnam, Cambodia is planning
to build the country’s first national drug
rehabilitation center to help combat Cambodia’s rampant drug problem. Bong Sen,
a Vietnamese drug, would be at least one
of the treatments provided to patients at
the proposed center. Ben Tre Fataco has
been actively involved in the negotiations,
including being present on at least one of
the official visits of Vietnamese officials to
discuss the deal.
As an increasing number of major pharmaceutical companies outsource their trials
to developing countries, the prevalence of
unethical drug trials in these areas has been
a subject of recent interest for human rights
and medical organizations. The Bong Sen
trials in Cambodia highlight this concern. These trials must abide only by the
host government’s standards, which are
often minimal and rarely enforced. Since
the people affected are already some of
the most vulnerable, the ethical and legal
implications of drug trials in developing
countries deserve considerably more attention. While drug trials offer the possibility
for new, potentially lifesaving, treatments,
the human costs of involuntary and unethical medical testing must be vigilantly
scrutinized.

Morality Law Threatens
Indonesian Unity
Police arrested four women for “sexy
dancing” during a New Year’s Eve party
at the Belair Coyote Bar and Restaurant in
Bandung, Indonesia. These women, along
with an event organizer and a manager
of the club, could be among the first
charged under Indonesia’s controversial
anti-pornography law, passed just over one
year ago. The law’s sweeping reach goes
beyond merely prohibiting the possession
of pornographic materials, but also proscribes any public performance or publication which could “arouse desire.” The
punishment for the dancers could be up to
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ten years in jail, while the organizer and
manager each face fifteen years.
Although it is not clear exactly what
prompted the arrests, the Belair Coyote
typically features young women dancing
in bikinis. Arman Achdiat, chief detective
for the local police, provided few details.
When asked what the women were wearing and how they were dancing, he commented, “It could be described as sexy
dancing. But more importantly, they were
wearing minimal clothing and performing
in public, which can stir desires.”
The anti-pornography law has been
under significant attack since its passage
in October 2008, but enforcement up until
now has been rare. Women’s groups, rights
groups, artists and non-Muslim cultural
groups have protested the law’s vagueness,
which leaves wide room for discriminatory
enforcement. Additionally, some claim that
the political forces behind the law are using
the public’s concerns about pornography
and immorality to eliminate non-Muslim
cultures in Indonesia. This attempt to eliminate minority cultural groups counters
international law aimed at protecting cultural and minority rights, along with religious freedom.

For example, in West Java, where Bandung is located, concerns center around a
traditional dance called jaipong, which
comes from West Java’s Sundanese culture.
The dance features female dancers moving
their arms, hands and hips in what critics,
including West Java’s governor, say is a
suggestive, sensual manner. With support
from the Indonesian Ulama Council, a
leading Muslim clerical organization, the
government of West Java has made efforts
to promote the law. Hafizh Utsman, the
leader of West Java’s branch of the Council,
stated that “[w]e are trying to eliminate the
non-Islamic parts of West Java’s traditional
culture, to make it more Islamic.”
The new law has been challenged in the
Constitutional Court, but so far has been
upheld. A broad range of approximately
thirty rights groups recently challenged the
law as an unconstitutionally broad threat
to artistic, religious, and cultural freedom.
Proponents of the law, however, continued to articulate its moral necessity. The
government’s witnesses at the trial argued
that children’s exposure to explicit images
is detrimental to their moral and physical
development, with one government expert
claiming that watching suggestive images
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“may result in brain damage similar to having a traffic accident.”
The anti-pornography law is just one
example of a growing interconnection
between Islam and politics in Indonesia, which continues to threaten the secular and diverse political tradition of the
country. Moreover, widespread discrepancies among the provinces in promoting
the Islamization of Indonesia evidence
an increasing divide. While Banda Aceh
continues to enact stricter sharia laws, the
governor of Bali declared last year that he
will not enforce the anti-pornography law.
Some fear that stringent enforcement of
the law could further threaten the alreadyfraying unity of the Indonesian government, and give more fuel to secessionist
provinces.		
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